Difference between revisions of "TACL Seminar Fall '02"

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| Dec 3 || [http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~sudhakar/ Sudhakar Govindavajhala] || Using Memory Errors to Attack a Virtual Machine || [[TACL_Seminar_Fall_'02#Sudhakar Govindavajhala | Abstract]]  
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| Dec 3 || [http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~sudhakar/ Sudhakar Govindavajhala] || Using Memory Errors to Attack a Virtual Machine || [[TACL_Seminar_Fall_'02#Sudhakar Govindavajhala | Abstract]]
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| Dec 10 || [http://ece-www.colorado.edu/~manishv/ Manish Vachharajani] || A Component Composition and Customization Language for the Liberty Simulation Environment || [[TACL_Seminar_Fall_'02#Manish Vachharajani]]
 
| Dec 10 || [http://ece-www.colorado.edu/~manishv/ Manish Vachharajani] || A Component Composition and Customization Language for the Liberty Simulation Environment || [[TACL_Seminar_Fall_'02#Manish Vachharajani]]
 
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Revision as of 03:25, 27 August 2006

TACL Seminar

Fall '02 Schedule

Date Speaker Title Links
Dec 3 Sudhakar Govindavajhala Using Memory Errors to Attack a Virtual Machine Abstract
Dec 10 Manish Vachharajani A Component Composition and Customization Language for the Liberty Simulation Environment TACL_Seminar_Fall_'02#Manish Vachharajani

Abstracts

Sudhakar Govindavajhala

Using Memory Errors to Attack a Virtual Machine

We present an experimental study showing that soft memory errors can lead to serious security vulnerabilities in Java and .NET virtual machines, or in any system that relies on type-checking of untrusted programs as a protection mechanism. Our attack works by sending to the JVM for execution a Java program that is designed so that almost any memory error in its address space will allow it to take control of the JVM. All conventional Java and .NET virtual machines are vulnerable to this attack. The technique of the attack is broadly applicable against other language-based security schemes such as proof-carrying code.

We measured the attack on two commercial Java Virtual Machines: Sun's and IBM's. We show that a single-bit error in the Java program's data space can be exploited to execute arbitrary code with a probability of about 70%, and multiple-bit errors with a lower probability.

Our attack is particularly relevant against smart cards or tamper-resistant computers, where the user has physical access (to the outside of the computer) and can use various means to induce faults; we have successfully used heat. Fortunately, there are some straightforward defenses against this attack.

This is joint work with Andrew Appel.


TACL Seminar